Introduction
During the current financial crisis governments have been forced to take over large parts of the banking system. Potentially this public sector involvement in the banking sector has considerable long run effects in all major industrialized countries. One of the most important functions of a financial system is that financial intermediaries select entrepreneurs with the best chances of developing new products which increases the rate of technological progress in an economy (King and Levine 1993; Levine and Zervos 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000a; Levine 2005 for a survey).
1 Thus, banking development stimulates the introduction of innovations (Benfratello, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli 2008) . In this paper we examine whether public or private financial intermediaries are better in selecting promising innovative projects and thus foster technological progress. More specifically, we analyze the impact of government owned versus private owned banks on the innovation ability of corporations.
Theory is ambivalent about the effect of government bank ownership on technological progress. On the one hand, government owned banks might alleviate market failures in the process of innovation financing thereby fostering growth. The most important market failures associated with financing innovations are asymmetric information and moral hazard (Carpenter and Petersen 2002; Hall 2002) 2 as well as the existence of positive externalities generated by the provision of external finance for innovations. 3 The existence of such externalities might be a rationale for a subsidy in the form of government financing (e.g. Hainz and Hakenes 2007) .
1 Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000b) find a positive correlation between financial development and TFP growth.
2 A new technology is less understood by third parties and during the development of the new technology few interim signals on its outcome can be verified (Goodacre and Tonks 1995) . Furthermore, the salvage value from financing innovation is small leaving the entrepreneur with stronger incentives to add risk since a large proportion of the losses accrues to the outside financier (see also Herrera and Minetti 2007) .
3 Such externalities are first of all technology spill-overs, but can also take the form of regional employment prospects etc. See Romer (1990) , Aghion and Howitt (1992) or Aghion and Howitt (1997) for an overview.
On the other hand, government bankers' incentives can result in a misallocation of financial resources (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002; Sapienza 2004 ).
The causes of resource misallocation associated with government financing are manifold: e.g. politicians tend to influence their bankers' financing decisions for their personal goals or government banks are reluctant to shut down unprofitable corporations to secure employment. 4 This political view of government bank ownership implies that government banks may not facilitate an efficient allocation of resources by preventing capital to be channeled to new innovative enterprises. Thus, there are diverging arguments about the effect of government ownership of banks on corporate innovation. It remains therefore an empirical question to be answered as evidence on this issue for industrialized countries is rare.
There are recent papers that have shown that credit relationships may affect corporate innovation. Herrera and Minetti (2007) find that a stronger relationship between lender and borrower, proxied by the duration of the credit relationship between the lender and the borrower, promotes innovation. Benfratello, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli (2008) show that local banking development matters for the probability of corporate innovations. Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru (2005) document for a sample of large publicly traded US firms that more innovative firms actually prefer arm's length financing to relationship borrowing.
Our paper differs in several dimensions from previous work in the field. Studies of bank governance mostly focus on developing countries (e.g. Khwaja and Mian 2005) . In developing countries it is difficult to differentiate between particular institutional characteristics (e.g. corruption) of these economies and the consequences of government bank ownership. Therefore, these findings cannot be generalized for in-4 Following government deregulation of the French banking sector, Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007) find that banks were less willing to bail out poorly performing firms and are more likely to support restructuring activities. Consequently, they observe an improvement in allocative efficiency across firms following deregulation. Khwaja and Mian (2005) present empirical evidence for Pakistan. They find that government banks systematically favor political connected firms (i.e. firms whose director participates in an election) over non-connected firms even though loans to connected firms have a 50 percent higher default rate. They estimate the economy wide costs of the rents associated with connected lending to be 0.3 to 1.9 percent of GDP every year.
dustrialized countries. The German corporate landscape provides a good laboratory to examine the link between bank ownership and firms' innovation decision and thereby fill this gap. First, because corruption is rather low, it is not the main driver of government bankers actions. Second, the German financial sector is bank-based, banks are the prevalent source of finance for German firms, market-based financing is of secondary importance. Third, the existing government banking sector has about the same size than the private banking sector. Finally, the German economy is characterized as innovative.
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We construct a unique dataset that allows us to observe individual corporate lending relationships. For a sample of 9 000 German manufacturing enterprises we determine their credit relationships for all loans exceeding 1.5 million Euros through the Bundesbank credit register for the years 1993 to 2006. Combining this dataset with patent information from the European Patent Office allows us to identify firms' innovation activity as well as the type of main lender.
Another novelty of our paper is that we model firms' selection of their main lender.
A central concern for our study is a possible problem of endogeneity, namely that firms might choose a specific type of bank depending on their innovation activity. Thus, firms that plan to innovate in the future might choose a government owned or private bank depending on the banks' willingness to finance new technologies. We overcome this endogeneity problem by identifying all existing bank branches located near our sample firms. This measure is used as instrument (as discussed at length in section 4.1), because previous research has shown that geographic distance plays an important role in relationship banking (e.g. Degryse and Ongena 2005; Petersen and Rajan 2002) .
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Especially small firms bear considerable costs if applying for external finance with non-5 According to the OECD (2007) R&D spending in Germany is well above the OECD average in 2005.
6 There is also evidence that the emergence of local entrepreneurship depends on regional financial development. Michelacci and Silva (2007) have documented the importance of local financial development for local entrepreneurs.
regional banks.
7 Since private banks do not have branches in geographic proximity to all our sample firms, some firms have only government owned banks in close geographic proximity. This allows us to identify whether the ownership type of a bank itself has a causal effect on the innovation activity of a firm.
We argue that the type of lending relationship endogenously affects a firm's innovation activity. This raises the question why potentially innovative firms do not simply switch their main lender if e.g. private banks are better suited to finance new technologies. As mentioned before, asymmetric information and moral hazard are especially pronounced in the process of technology financing. A bank can moderate this moral hazard problem by gathering information on the new technology to be financed (Herrera and Minetti 2007) . In this process a firm's main lender generally functions as a delegated monitor for the other lenders (Diamond 1984) and is therefore the main producer of information concerning the borrower. Once a firm is stuck in a relationship with a main lender it is difficult to switch to a new financier. The problem is that potential new financiers know that a firm's main lender has an informational advantage regarding the borrower. Consequently, switching the main bank is likely to be very costly either because the new lender lacks information or switching the lender conveys a bad signal (since the new lender may assume that a financing decision was refused by the old lender). This hold-up problem is especially pronounced for technology finance since such projects tend to be informationally opaque.
We find that a firm's probability to innovate is related to the ownership of its main lender. The probability of a firm to innovate is about 10 to 13 percent higher if the main lender is a private as opposed to a government bank (after controlling for firm characteristics and selectivity bias). These findings are based on a bivariate probit model with full maximum likelihood estimation. The ownership type of the main lender is especially important for smaller firms, since their access to finance is more dependent on the local supply of lenders. Among innovating firms, those with 7 For large firms that have access to financial intermediaries nationwide as well as to national and international securities markets, local banking market development matters to a smaller extend (Benfratello, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli 2008) . a private main lender tend to produce more innovation compared to firms with a government main lender.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the German banking system, the construction of our dataset and provides descriptive statistics. In Section 3 we introduce the empirical analysis we follow in this paper.
Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes.
Data and descriptives

The German banking sector
The Germany financial sector is bank-based, with a universal banking system. One of the particularities of the German banking sector is the so called three pillar structure which refers to the three different legal ownership forms of German banks. The three forms are government owned banks, private banks and credit cooperatives. While credit cooperatives mostly specialize in household and small business finance, private and government owned banks compete for enterprise financing. In the following, we focus on the differences between government owned banks and private banks, these two groups hold together 84.5% of the total assets of German banks (39% held by private banks and 45.5% by government owned banks, see Table II) .
8 While the market share of government owned banks in Germany is relatively high by European standards (Hartmann, Heider, Papaioannou, and Duca 2007) , a high share of government involvement in the banking sector is not uncommon else where. Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes, and Shleifer (2002) find for a large sample of countries, that on average 30% of the banking sectors were controlled by governments in 1995.
The specific structure of the German banking sector has evolved over time. The first public saving banks were founded in the 18th/19th century in Germany in order 8 We restrict our analysis to these two groups, as credit cooperatives are underrepresented in our sample. The reason is that credit cooperatives are typically very small and therefore are generally not the main lenders of our sample firms.
to make savings accounts accessible and the first joint stock banks were founded in the 19th century.
9 The structure of the government owned banking sector is the result of laws implemented at the beginning of the twentieth century and after the second world war. This so-called 'Sparkassengesetz' gave rise to a country wide community banking sector. Nowadays, government owned banks, also referred to as saving banks, are owned by local communities and state governments. The regional principle requires from community banks to supply local finance and prevents competition between government owned banks by forbidding them to serve customers beyond their community.
The objectives of government owned banks as laid down in the respective laws (e.g. Figure 1 for the district of Karlsruhe. As can be seen in this graph, government owned banks possess a dense branch network in rural as well as urban areas. The strong presence of government owned banks in rural areas is a result of the aforementioned regional principle. As a consequence rural areas have an especially high branch density and therefore private banks generally tend to concentrate their branches in urban areas.
9 See Hackethal (2004) and Brunner, Decressin, Hardy, and Kudela (2004) for more information on the German Banking market.
10 Commonly this legal framework includes a statement that profit maximization is not the main objective of government owned banks and that they have to serve common welfare. Other objectives are to provide a checking account to every private person independent of her income and the economic education of the youth (see the 'Sparkassengesetze', 'Sparkassenordnung' and 'Landesbankgesetz' of the Länder in Germany).
11 Within Europe Germany is among the countries with the highest number of credit institutions, branches and bank employees, see European Central Bank (2007) for details.
Firm data and their innovation abilities
Time series information of financial statements of German corporations is obtained from Bureau van Dyck's Amadeus database. As a starting point we take all German manufacturing firms and obtain 9,310 firms and 32,839 firm year observations (for the period [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . A detailed description of the underlying data sets and the matching strategies can be found in Appendix A.
In order to measure the innovation activity of firms we collect data on successful patent applications for our sample firms. Patent applications have been used in several empirical studies to measure the innovation activity of firms (Seru 2007; Angrist and Krueger 1991) and have been found to be superior to accounting figures to measure corporate innovation activity (Griliches and Mairesse 1991; Trajtenberg 1990a,b) .
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We collect patent information from the European patent office (EPO) extracted from the EP-CESPRI database. We have information on the number of patents per firm each year and information on the number of citations 13 per year from EPO (see Table   III for a distribution of patent application and citations per industry). We use both the number of patents to measure innovation intensity as well as a binary variable classifying firms into innovators and non-innovators.
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We link financial statement information of our sample firms to the German credit register of the Deutsche Bundesbank. This allows us to identify the lenders to a firm and provides us also with data for lending relationships from 1993 to 2006. The credit register includes information on each credit relationship if the total outstanding amount of loans in a given quarter exceeds 1.5 million Euros. 15 We are therefore able to classify the firms based on their main lender (private or government owned), 12 In addition, according the German accounting standards (HGB) R&D expenditures include expenditures to purchase patents and copyright rights and are therefore not appropriate to measure the innovation activity of a firm (see Bessler and Bittelmeyer 2006, and Jeny and Stolowy 1999) . 13 In the patent application process the relation to other patents has to be clarified and in this process precedent patents to which the new invention is related are cited. See Haeussler, Mueller, and Harhoff (2009) for a more detailed description.
14 For the definition of the variables see Table I . 15 Please refer to Schmieder (2006) for a detailed description of the credit register of the Bundesbank.
defining the main lender as the bank granting the highest share of loans to the firm.
Finally, in order to control for the different regional environments that firms operate in (government owned banks tend to be more represented in rural areas), we also collect data on local community development (GDP per capita per region) and population density.
We have to control for the fact that the main lender choice of a firm may be endogenous, as will be discussed at length in Section 4.1. We therefore collect information on the ownership of banks and branches close to the firms in our sample (within a radius of 3 km around each firm, a surface of about 28 km 2 ). As mentioned before distance matters in the relationship between firms and their lender. Our aim is to find a measure of local bank supply provided by private and government owned banks in close geographic proximity to our sample firms. Thus, we count the number of banks and branches in proximity to the firms and the number of private (share private) and government owned banks. Our instrument will be the share of private banks (to the sum of private and government owned banks). We also calculate the number of private and government owned banks within a radius of 10 km (a surface of about 315 km 2 ).
All data sources are matched as described in Appendix A. We end up with a data set of 12,343 observations for 4,588 firms. About one third of all observations are from innovative firms (see Table IV ), 1,362 of these observations have a government owned bank as main lender and 2,860 a private bank. Our sample firms have on average total assets of 265 million Euros and a debt to assets ratio of 28%. Overall, we have a share of 40% of private banks.
In order to obtain initial insights into the relationship between firm innovation and bank ownership, we present descriptive statistics for firms having either a government owned or a private bank as main lender. We find that firms having a private bank as main lender are more likely innovative, the difference being fairly high with 10%.
They furthermore apply on average for 1.5 patents more than customers of government owned banks, supporting the hypothesis that these two groups differ substantially. On average, firms with a private main lender are somewhat larger and older. If a private bank serves as a main lender the number of total lenders is generally larger. Private bank customers tend to be in regions with a higher population density, a higher output per capita and a larger supply of bank branches in geographic proximity. Finally we can see evidence that geographic proximity matters for the formation of a lending relationship. Firms that have a lending relatinship with a private bank also have a higher number and share of private banks in a radius of 3 km around them.
We also compare innovative and non-innovative firms. The innovative firms in our sample are larger (measured by assets, sales or number of employees) and older than their not innovative counterparts (see column 4 of Table IV ). Innovative firms have more bank branches, especially from private banks, in close geographic distance and are settled in more populated and economically more active regions.
Empirical analysis
We assume that a firm (i) has a choice to innovate or use an existing technology. This choice can be modeled as follows:
with y is our measure of innovation that takes the value of one if firm i decides for a new technology (gets a patent granted during our sample period) and zero otherwise.
The decision to innovate is likely to depend on a series of firm specific characteristics such as industry sector, firm size and firm age that are summarized by the vector X i .
Whether the main lender of a firm is a government or private bank is captured by F i , that takes the value of one if a government owned bank is the main lender and zero if the main lender is a private bank. Our coefficient of interest is δ that aims at measuring the sensitivity of ownership of the main bank to a firm's decision to innovate. We refer to specification 1 as our 'outcome' equation.
This interpretation of δ is, however, problematic if the choice of the Financier F i and the decision to innovate are jointly determined. If a firm expects that one of the two types of banks is better suited to finance innovation, it might choose the bank that suits its preferences best. In this case, the average treatment effect δ would capture this choice of a firm and not an endogenous effect of the main bank's ownership type on innovation by the borrowing firm.
In order to control for this selectivity bias, we introduce a bivariate probit model (Heckman 1978) in which a firm's decision to innovate is jointly determined by a firm's choice of the ownership of its main bank. The selection equation is as follows:
with Z i being a vector of instruments. Equation 2 is referred to as our 'selection' equation.
Both decisions of the firm that we model (the innovation and the main bank selection) are binary, so that there are four states of the world. The likelihood function corresponding to this set of events is a bivariate probit model. A similar research design has been applied in several empirical studies such as Evans and Schwab (1995) .
In a second step we examine the innovation intensity among the firms classified as innovators. We use the number of patents each innovator applies for as the dependent variable of the 'innovation' equation. In this case our two equation system corresponds to a classical treatment model. This model can be either estimated by full maximum likelihood or a two stage procedure (Imbens and Angrist 1994) . We repeat these tests replacing the number of patents with the number of citations. This test allows us to measure the relative importance of the granted patents. Furthermore, we reestimate our main model by applying alternative definitions for a firm's main lender and alternative definition of our instrument.
Results
The choice between a government and private main lender
We start with the estimation of our 'selection' equation. We use the number of private bank branches to all bank branches located in a radius of 3 km around each firm as an instrument. For our instrument to be valid two conditions have to be met. First, it has to be an important determinant of a firm's decision to select its main lender. Second, it must not be a determinant of a firm's decision to innovate. The first condition can be easily tested by simply estimating the selection equation 2 individually and testing for the explanatory power of the instrument.
Results are shown in Figure 1 , the latter finding could be driven by differences in the population density around firm's location. Therefore, we include population density (pop density) and regional development (regional GDP ) of the community a firm is located in (see Panel B column 1'). Both factors have an impact on the main bank selection. In more populated areas, more private banks exist, and therefore firms are less likely to have a government bank as a main lender.
Second, the location of private bank branches in close geographic proximity of a firm may not be a determinant of a firm's innovation decision. One way to test for this is to include our instrument share private in the outcome equation. This does not constitute a formal test since we have argued before that a bivariate probit is the correct specification. Nevertheless, this test allows us to analyze the correlation between the probability to innovate and the relative number of private branches in the proximity of a firm once controlling for other firm characteristics. As shown in Table VI , the estimated coefficient of share private is statistically not significant. Even though this is not a formal test for the validity of our instrument, no direct relationship between the bank-firm location and the probability to innovate is detected.
For our instrument to be meaningful, it is further important that bank as well as firm location are not endogenously determined (e.g. a certain bank type does not choose location based on innovation activity of firms and firms do not locate in proximity to a certain bank type based on their innovation actvity). We are less concerned about endogeneity of bank branch location in Germany. As argued before the regional principle demands from government owned banks to establish a dense branch network in order to provide an areawide supply of finance (see Section 2.1).
Thus, the locational choice of government banks is largely predetermined by law.
The observed regional distribution of private and government owned bank branches corresponds with these considerations (see Figure 1) . Thus, while firms located in urban areas generally have a choice between private and government owned lenders, firms located in rural areas often only find government owned banks in geographic proximity.
Arguing that firm location is not chosen endogenously is more difficult. In our sample of manufacturing firms, moving is not frictionless since it requires the relocation of manufacturing halls and machines. These frictions should be especially important for small firms and firms with a high fraction of tangible assets, since moving location is more costly. In order to see whether firm location is determined endogenously we reestimate our model only for firms with a fraction of tangible assets in the top quartile.
Results are reported in the subsequent section.
Larger firms are likely to have better access to nationwide banking markets and therefore rely less on the conditions of their local banking market. Furthermore, larger firms may alternatively access market based finance. Consequently, our instrument should be more relevant for smaller firms. To test for this presumption we stepwise remove large firms from our sample and reestimate our selection equation for the remaining sample. Results are reported in Table V In column 1 we exclude community controls (pop density and regional GDP ) from the selection equation, while these controls are included in the system presented in column 2. Having instrumented for the selection of a bank's choice of its main lender, the ownership type of the banker (F i ) has a significant impact on a firm's probability to innovate. The probability to innovate is about 13 percent higher for firms with a private as compared to a government main lender (see marginal effects reported beside the coefficients). 16 The coefficients of the firm characteristics suggest that older and larger firms are more likely to innovate. The correlation between the error terms of the outcome and selection equation is denoted by ρ. As reported in the lower part of the table, we can reject the hypothesis that ρ is equal to zero, establishing the need for a bivariate estimation technique of our model.
Government ownership and innovation
Results for firms with a high fraction of tangible assets and thus high moving costs are reported in Table VII , column 3. Results are robust for estimation of this 16 Marginal effects have been calculated following Greene (1996) .
subsample. The probability to innovate for a firm that is in a lending relationship with a government owned bank is actually even smaller. we further drop the largest firms from the sample (see columns 3 to 5) the coefficient of the Financier variable increases by magnitude. Thus, the negative effect of government bankers on a firm's innovation probability is larger for small firms. A rationale for this finding is that larger firms can also access financial markets nationwide while smaller firms are more dependent on local banks.
Finally, we test for the impact of the main lender's ownership on the number of innovations among innovating firms. In the previous analysis we modeled a firm's decision to innovate by a binary variable. In our underlying dataset, we have coded the number of patents each innovating firm has successfully applied for. Thus, we have a measure for the number of innovations for our sample firms. We estimate the same two equation system as before using the number of patents each innovator has been granted during our sample period as the outcome variable. Since in this system the outcome variable is not binary we can estimate the system with a treatmenteffects model by using a two-step consistent estimator. The treatment-effects model considers the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment on another endogenous continuous variable. Results are reported in Table IX . Among innovating firms, those firms with a private main lender tend to apply for more patents after controlling for firm characteristics and selectivity bias. This result is significant at the 99% hurdle.
Thus, bank ownership has not only an effect on a firm's innovation decision, but also on the innovation intensity of a firm.
Furthermore we use information on citations as the dependent variable in our analysis. The advantage of using citations instead of patent filings is that citations convey information about the economic value of patents (see Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, and Vopel (1999) ). Patents which are more often cited have a higher economic value and can therefore being seen as a measure of the quality of the invention. Results are shown in column 2 of Table IX. A lending relationship with a government owned bank has a negative significant impact on the quality-weighted amount of innovations a firm produces.
Robustness tests
So far, we have chosen each firm's largest lender as the main bank. Our definition of the main lender is based on Diamond (1984) who argued that the largest lender of a firm generally functions as a delegated monitor of the other lenders. In the relationship banking literature alternative definitions for the main lender are used.
Memmel, Schmieder, and Stein (2007) require a bank to lend at least 80% of all all outstanding loans to a firm to name it its main lender. We test for the robustness of our findings by reestimation the bivariate probit model for alternative definitions for the main lender in Table X . In column 1, we require a bank to lend at least 80% and in column 2 at least 60% of all outstanding loans to be a firm's main lender. Results remain unaffected. A main government lender has a highly significant negative impact on a firm's innovation probability. The marginal effect is about 11 percent.
In all previous estimations we have chosen a radius of 3 km around each firm to define local banking supply. We replicated the analysis allowing for a wider radius of 10 km. Results remain unaffected by using this alternative definition of our instrument (see Table XI ).
Conclusion
Providing external finance for corporate innovation is a key mechanism through which banks affect economic growth. We find that ownership (government owned versus private) of financial intermediaries has an impact on firms' innovation activity. Firms that have a government owned bank as a main lender are less likely to develop innovations compared to firms that have a lending relationship with a private bank. This finding is especially pronounced for smaller /medium-sized firms with limited access to nationwide financial markets. Among the innovators, firms that have their main lending relationship with a private bank apply for more patents compared to those that have a government owned bank as main lender.
These findings suggest that private banks are superior to government owned banks in selecting successful innovative projects. One reason why the private sector appears to be better at stimulating innovation could be that private bankers have incentives to maximize shareholder value. Government bankers' incentives are manifold and, thereby may be less likely to support restructuring activities and more willing to allocate resources in old often less innovative firms. These findings have important policy implications for government ownership of banks. While a high degree of government involvement in banking is inevitable in view of the financial crises to stabilize the system, the present study suggests that government involvement in the allocation of credit to firms comes at the cost of lower innovation and thus growth. 
Appendix A. Description and construction of the data set
Amadeus database We use data from Bureau van Dyck, the Amadeus database for German firms. This database provides standardized annual account data and financial ratios. We restrain our sample to unconsolidated (in order to prevent double counting) annual account information of manufacturing firms. 17 We drop observations with turnover or assets reported as to be zero and firms with implausible financial data (negative values for debt). We therefore end up with an unbalanced panel of 9,309 German firms in the period from 1994 to 2007.
German credit register The Deutsche Bundesbank collects for regulatory purpose information for every credit granted in Germany when the sum of outstanding loans of a creditor exceed 1.5 Mio Euro. Information are collected on a quarterly basis and every credit exceeding the threshold once in the respective quarter has to be reported, thus entries in the credit register may be smaller than 1.5 Mio Euro. The credit register provides information about the borrower (name and address), the lender (name of the bank) and a classification of the credit. We focus on credits being on balance sheet positions in the years 1993 to 2006, taking the respective entry of the quarter in which balance sheet data in the Amadeus database is reported.
RH: what does the subsequent sentence mean?Having collected information on the credits of a firm from the credit register, we end up with mostly more than one observation from the credit register matched to one firm in the Amadeus database. We try to control if the sum of the loans taken from the credit register is in line with the indebtedness reported in the financial statements of the Amadeus database by calculating a coverage ratio (sum of loans as reported in the credit register divided by the indebtedness taken from the Amadeus database). This allows us furthermore to control if our matching procedure gives reasonable results. We find a median of 0.957 for this coverage ratio which is generally in line with those found by other studies using the German credit register (Memmel, Schmieder, and Stein 2007; Ongena, Tuemer-Alkan, and Westernhagen 2007) .
Innovation data The information on patents are part of the EP-CESPRI database, provided by Gianluca Tarasconi. This database is based on the information published by the European Patent Office (EPO) in Espace Bulletin and REFI. It covers all patents granted to German firms by the EPO from 1978-2006. The database includes a count of the patents granted and a count of citations of the patents by priority year 18 together with the firm name and address. Patents are assigned to the firm the innovator is working for at the moment of the patent application.
Bank branches data and geocoding procedure We collected data from the BankenVerlag Medien GmbH about the branch network of German banks in 2007. This database provides us the addresses of all banks and bank branches (of German and foreign banks) in Germany.
17 The three-digit US SIC codes from 200 to 399. 18 Date of first application of the patent to any patent office, not the application date at the EPO.
For the calculation of the distance between bank branches and firms, we use geocodes (degrees of latitude and longitude). We add geocodes to our observations from the Amadeus database and to the addresses of the banks and their branches using the website MyGeoposition 19 and control the results via googlemaps. We use these geocodes to calculate the distance between firms and banks (using the great-circle-distance-method) and count the number of private and government owned banks in a certain distance to the firms. We used 3 km and 10 km as a radius around each firm, this equals an area of about 28km 2 and 314km 2 .
Regional data We use data on the regional development (GDP, GDP per capita) and population density for German administrative districts (Landkreis) 20 from the statistical offices of the Federation and the Länder.
Matching procedure We link information from different data set that do not have a unique numeric identifier. Therefore, we matched these different data sources by the name, address and legal form of the respective firms.
For this procedure we apply the reclink-ado for STATA (Blasnik, 2007) . It uses record linkage methods to match observations when no unique common identifier exists and gives a probability of matching correctness. Reclink uses a bigram string comparator to assess fuzzy matches of string variables and allows to match over more than one variable.
In order to improve the results of the matching procedure, we unify the spelling of the firm names. We drop all special characters use only uppercase letters. In a first step we match only those observations being in the same zip code area (we define zip code regions by the first two numbers of the zip code in case one data base reports the street zip code and the other post office box zip code. Then we group zip codes by steps of 5000, e.g. all observations with zip codes from 10000 to 15000 form one region). We manually control the results of the matching procedure to ensure the correctness of the matching results. In a second step, we further shorten the names by dropping common words and abbreviations and then match by the first letters of the firm-names and by zip code areas. We again inspect the results. In a last step we try to match all observations from the credit register not reporting any zip codes to the firms in the Amadeus database by only matching on the names. The data on innovation (patents) are matched to the Amadeus database in the same manner.
Appendix B. Regional distribution of private and government owned bank branches Grey-shaded areas illustrate larger cities (more than 25,000 inhabitants) and their surface. All other cities displayed have more than 5,000 inhabitants.
The small map in the down right corner shows Germany, the black area displays the district of Karlsruhe. Number of patents and citations per industry Notes: Number of patents and citations from the European Patent Office (EPO). Innovative is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm applied at least once successfully for a patent during the sample period and 0 otherwise. Industries grouped by two-digit SIC-codes, classification in high-tech and low-tech according to Parisi, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli (2006) . The number of observations (N) are reported in the last column. Table I for definitions. Column 2 presents results for all firms, column (2) and (3) for innovative and not innovative firms (Innovative) and columns (5) and (6) for firms having as main lender a private or a government owned bank (Financier ). The number of observations (N) of each variable is reported in parentheses below the respective mean values. Columns (4) and (7) present results of t-test for differences in means between the groups of firms, p-value below in parentheses.
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, where i indexes for firm and t for year. The dependent variable y it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm has been innovative during our sample period and 0 otherwise. Firm specific characteristics are summarized by the vector X it . F it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the main lender is a government owned bank and 0 if the main lender is a private bank. A vector of instruments is denoted by Z it . All variables are defined as in Table I . Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The bottom line of the table states the number of observations of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) 
where i indexes for firm and t for year. The dependent variable y it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm has been innovative during our sample period and 0 otherwise. Firm specific characteristics are summarized by the vector X it . F it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the main lender is a government owned bank and 0 if the main lender is a private bank. The 'outcome' equation is simultaneously estimated with the 'selection' equation
full maximum likelihood estimation. The vector of instruments is denoted by Z it . All variables are defined as in Table I . Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. Marginal effects at the means (and the effect of a change from zero to one for dummy variables) are reported besides the coefficients. In column 1 control variables for the community each firm operates in are included in the 'selection' equation. The correlation between the error terms of the 'outcome' and 'selection' equation is denoted by ρ. The bottom line of the table states the value of the likelihood function and the number of observations of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
, where i indexes for firm and t for year. The dependent variable y it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm has been innovative during our sample period and 0 otherwise. Firm specific characteristics are summarized by the vector X it . F it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the main lender is a government owned bank and 0 if the main lender is a private bank. Residuals are fitted residuals obtain from on OLS estimation of the 'selection' equation
The vector of instruments is denoted by Z it . All variables are defined as in Table I . Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The bottom line of the table states the number of observations of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Table IX Government banks and the number of innovations -treatment-effects model
Notes: The table reports estimates of a treatment-effects model using a two-step consistent estimator for the innovative sample firms. Coefficients are shown for the 'outcome' equation y it = α · X it + δ · F it + u it , where i indexes for firm and t for year. The dependent variable y it is the sum of all patents each innovative firm has been granted during the sample period. Firm specific characteristics are summarized by the vector X it . F it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the main lender is a government owned bank and 0 if the main lender is a private bank. The binary endogenous variable F it is instrumented by Z it . All variables are defined as in Table I . Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The bottom line of the table states the number of observations of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) Relationship banks and innovations -Bivariate probit estimations
Notes: The table reports estimates of the bivariate probit model described in Section 3. Coefficients are shown for the 'outcome' equation y it = α · X it + δ · F it + u it , where i indexes for firm and t for year. The dependent variable y it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm has been innovative during our sample period and 0 otherwise. Firm specific characteristics are summarized by the vector X it . In column 1 (2), F it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a government owned bank provides at least 80 (60) percent of a firm's outstanding loans and 0 if a private bank provides at least 80 (60) percent of a firm's outstanding loans (and missing otherwise). The 'outcome' equation is simultaneously estimated with the 'selection' equation F it = β ·X it +γ ·Z it +v it by full maximum likelihood estimation. The vector of instruments is denoted by Z it . All variables are defined as in Table I . Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. Marginal effects at the means (and the effect of a change from zero to one for dummy variables) are reported besides the coefficients. The correlation between the error terms of the 'outcome' and 'selection' equation is denoted by ρ. The bottom line of the table states the value of the likelihood function and the number of observations of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) Effect of a government lending relationship -Alternative definition of instrument 10 km radius Notes: The table reports estimates of a treatment-effects model using a two-step consistent estimator for the innovative sample firms. Coefficients are shown for the 'outcome' equation y it = α · X it + δ · F it + u it , where i indexes for firm and t for year. The dependent variable y it is the sum of all patents each innovative firm has been granted during the sample period. Firm specific characteristics are summarized by the vector X it . F it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the main lender is a government owned bank and 0 if the main lender is a private bank. The binary endogenous variable F it is instrumented by Z it . All variables are defined as in Table I . Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The bottom line of the table states the number of observations of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
